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Contracting is a widespread and popular management strategy in public organization across Western democracies. It is seen as an alternative to hierarchical and rule-based managing of relations between actors in order to improve accountability and performance (Drewry, Greve & Tanquerel, 2005; Fortin & van Hassel, 2000; Greve & Ejersbo, 2002; Verhoest, 2005). It remains, however, uncertain if and when contracting actually improves effectiveness and efficiency (Boyne, 1998) and how differences in contracting processes relate to performance. 

Both empirical investigations and theoretical aspirations stress that contract processes may explain contract effectiveness and performance (eg. Brown, Potoski & Van Slyke, 2007; Brown & Potoski, 2003; Fernandez, 2009; Yang, Hsieh & Shiun Li, 2009). Most studies focus, however, on external contracting and the relation between public and private partners. Further, few studies have investigated contracting processes and whether these affect performance in internal contracting. This question is important since to manage contracting effectively and avoid failure requires a conscious effort to identify the capacity and processes needed (Kettl, 1997). From the literature on performance management and contract capacity building we know that especially the processes of contracting and the formulating of performance measurements are crucial to improve performance and avoid perverse effects (see eg. Bruijn, 2007; Brown, Potoski & Van Slyke, 2007; Van Dooren, Bouckaert & Halligan, 2010). Hence, identifying whether contract processes affect performance may, therefore, contribute to improvement of internal contracting. 

The ambition of this article is to address this limitation within the literature on contracting and investigate the processes of internal contracts in Danish ministries. We describe these processes as well as investigate whether processes of internal contracting affect the goal attainment of the contracts in Danish agencies.

The literature on contracting has traditionally distinguished between dialogue-based contracts and control-based contracts (see eg. Greve & Ejersbo, 2005a; Verhoest, 2005). By combining this literature with the literature on performance management and contract capacity building we argue that contract processes affects performance. We expect that dialogue-based process of contracting (among others identified by a high level of dialogue and low level of control) improve performance measured as the degree of goal attainment in the performance contracts. The empirical analysis shows that the relationship between contracting processes and performance is ambiguous. Thus, the conclusion of the article supports former studies showing that the relationship between contract processes and performance are not always straightforward (Yang, Hsieh & Shiun Li, 2009). 

The article is structured in five sections. First, we define contracts and describe the difference between dialogue-based and control-based contracts. Second, we establish a link between contracting processes and performance. Third, we describe the design and methods applied. Fourth, we investigate variations in contracting across Danish Agencies and analyze whether the dialogic character of contracting processes affects goal attainment.
 
Variation in contracting 
Performance contracts have been introduced in most public administrations across Western democracies, including Danish agencies. Performance contracts are part of the NPM reforms introduced in the 1980’ onwards and in particular their emphasis on targets and performance of public organizations and individuals (Drewry, Greve & Tanquerel, 2005; Fortin & van Hassel, 2000; Greve & Ejersbo, 2002; Verhoest, 2005). 

Contracts are defined as ”…institutions for settling expectations and rewards linked to the performance of certain functions. They are set up to tackle the problem of asymmetric information.” (Greve 2000:154). The idea is, that specifying and formulating transparent, measureable and explicit goals in contracts improves the performance of public organizations (Bouckaert & Pollitt, 2000; Dunleavly & Hood, 1994), and enables the principal to, to some extent, accommodate the problem of asymmetric information by specifying performance demands. This increases the principals’ possibility for holding individuals and/or organizations accountable towards political and managerial goals and priorities (Day & Klein, 1987; Gruber, 1987). 

Contracting is, however, an ambiguous instrument. Contracting implies processes of influence and agreed goal setting in exchange for a certain level of managerial autonomy on one side and a consistent and congruent system of control and monitoring on the other side (Bryntse, 2005:157; Verhoest, 2005: 137). Thus, contracts represent both elements characterising NPM: a focus on management including the idea of granting autonomy to and let managers manage as well as a focus on performance through the establishment of incentives to increase performance and performance indicators which enables the principal as well as the public to control and hold agents accountable for their performance. 

To various degrees contracts may be dialogue-based (Greve 2000; Greve & Ejersbo 2005a; Verhoest, 2005). Control-based performance contracts represent the classical contracts where the principal specifies in detail the targets to be met in the contracts and dialogue between principal and agents are lmited (Greve & Ejersbo 2005a:17). Principals and agents are expected to have diverse interest, which they try to maximise when negotiating and entering contracts. Hence, the classical principal-agent problem regarding agents’ incentives to hide information is a salient problem in control-based performace contracts (Greve 2000:155). 

Dialogue-based performance contracts are entered between parties who, as agencies and departments, are placed in a long-term relationship (Greve 2000:155) characterised by strong mutual dependency. They are entered with ”…co-operation as the guiding principle…” (Greve 2000:155), which, as noted by Brownsword, stresses the mutual dependency between the contracting parties: ”Co-operation signals a certain way of relating to a fellow contractor, much as one would expect in a partnership. There is, so to speak, a joint investment in the contract, a mutual dependency.” (Brownsword 1996:19). Co-operation may be motivated both by interest, a sense of moral obligation or guided by institutional norms characterising any given society or organisation (Browsword 1996:21; Greve 2000:156). Dialogue-based internal contracts are, however, also entered within ’the shadow of hierarchy’ (Binderkrantz & Christensen 2009:57-58), where the hierarchical relation may be more or less evident in the contracting process and the degree of autonomy granted to agencies may vary. Contrary to control-based performance contracts the use of sanctions in dialogue-based performance contracts is not as explicit and prominent part of the contract (Greve & Ejersbo 2005a:18). 
Linking contract processes and goal attainment 
In order to link contract processes and goal attainment we draw on the literature on performance management and contract capacity building which enable us to establish a connection between dialogue-based and control-based contracting on one side and performance and goal attainment on the other side. Managing a performance-based contract system effectively is different from a more traditional authority-based system and it requires an effort to identify and create the capacity needed (Kettl, 1997). Thus, the efficiency and effectiveness of contracting in order to ensure goal attainment depends on the contracting processes. In line with the section above we pay particular attention to dialogue, autonomy, and control as the main aspect capturing the degree of ‘dialogue’ in contracting processes. Contracting processes refer to the various stages that are involved when departments and agencies enter, negotiate and evaluate performance contracts (Drewry, Greve & Tanquerel, 2005: 2). Dialogue and communication is considered crucial for performance measurements and contracts to improve performance (Kettl, 1997). Since dialogue-based performance contracts are characterized by negotiation during contract processes and are considered a tool for dialogue (Greve, 2000b) we expect that the degree of dialogue-based of performance contracts increase goal attainment. Thus, variations in the dialogue of contracting across Danish agencies are expected to influence goal attainment. The degree of dialogue of contracting is measured as dialogue in favour of control, agreement between agencies and departments in the formulation of performance demands and criteria for assessments, and agencies’ autonomy.      
Dialogue versus control
Dialogue and control is closely linked since dialogue between principal and agents may increase internal trust and therefore reduce the need for control (Fernandez, 2009; Kettl, 1997; Van Dooren, Bouckaert & Halligan, 2010; Verhoest, Verschuere & Bouckaert, 2007). Internal trust is believed to improve performance since it increases agents’ insensitive to perform in accord with agreed performance demands in contracts. Thus, dialogue between principal and agents are expected to increase trust and align agencies’ and departments’ interests and perceptions, which assumingly increase goal attainment. Furthermore, if agents engage in contracting processes and the formulation of performance demands internal legitimacy increases which may be a motivational factor in improvement of performance and goal attainment (Bruijn, 2007; Verhoest, Verschuere & Bouckaert, 2007). Finally, frequent communication and dialogue between principal and agents may reduce information asymmetry and serve as a substitute for control (Fernandez, 2009: 70; Brown, Potoski & Van Slyke, 2007). We expect, therefore, that the more contracting is based on dialogue in favour of control the more goal attainment increases. 

H1: The more contracting is based on dialogue in favour of control the higher degree of goal attainment 

Agreement between departments and agencies relate to dialogue and is also expected to increase goal attainment. Contracting and in particular the formulation of performance demands force public decision-makers to clarify their priorities and demands and specify key areas of expected performance on which organisations, individuals and units are held accountable (Henrich, 2007; Burningham, 1994). Thus, performance demands explicate political priorities down the hierarchy which enables agencies to predict what is expected of them (de Bruijn, 2007, 2008: 430). Hence, as argued by Binderkrantz and Christensen contracts is not only the principals’ solution to the problem of information asymmetry, in may also be an occasion to balance the contracting parties expectations to agencies’ performance (2010:55). If agents agree on the measures they feel more accountable towards the system and they will to a larger extend tend to perform in accord with agreed performance demands (de Bruijn, 2007). Thus, agreement will increase goal attainment. We distinguish between agreements at various stages of contracting processes and differentiate between agreement between agencies and departments on performance demands vis-à-vis the criteria for assessing goal attainment. We expect that agreement between agencies and departments on performance demands and the criteria for assessing goal attainment respectively increase goal attainment  

H2: Agreement between agencies and departments on performance demands increases goal attainment

H3: Agreement between agencies and departments on the criteria for assessing goal attainment increases goal attainment
 
Autonomy
Contracting is to replace bureaucratic authority with organizational autonomy, which is expected to improve organizational performance (Van Dooren, Bouckaert & Halligan, 2010). In return for a consistent system of performance control which is part of contracting and in particular performance management departments delegate specialized functions (steering not rowing) and managerial autonomy to agents, aiming at a more professional and creative approach to management (Smullen, 2007:15; Verhoest, Verschuere & Bouckaert, 2007). The intention is to base the control of the agents on results and grant them autonomy to define how to reach targets and performance demands. Due to information asymmetry agents know better than principals how to fulfil performance demands why granting autonomy to the agents will improve organizational performance. The argument is based upon the NPM literature and its emphasis on ‘let the manger manage’ combined with controlling agents on results which is believed to put organizations under (internal) pressure as a vehicle for the improvement of performance (Verhoest, Verschuere & Bouckaert, 2007:470). The degree of autonomy granted to the agents may differ, as contracting in internal relations do not replace, but supplement the bureaucratic authority. We expect therefore, that the more autonomy is granted in contracting the higher degree of goal attainment. 

H4: The more autonomy is granted in contracting the higher degree of goal attainment 

Design and Methods
To measure the degree of goal attainment all agency-contracts for 2008 as well as the subsequent ‘enterprise accounts’ defining the goal attainment has been collected. In 2008 there were 62 agencies and 58 of these had a contract. Contracting in Danish agencies is ideal to study contracting processes since performance contracts in Danish agencies date back to 1992 and have become institutionalized practice (Greve & Ejersbo, 2005a). This increases the possibility to find variations across agencies since departments and agencies have had time to build up trust and dialogue.    

In the performance contracts each performance demand in each contract has been coded. In the enterprise accounts the goal attainment for the corresponding performance demands has been coded as fulfilled, partly fulfilled or not fulfilled. The codification is to a large extent based on the assessments made by agencies and department in the enterprise accounts. 90 % of the performance demands have been assessed. In the subsequent analysis we use the percentage of fulfilled performance demands as the dependent variable. That is the percentage of fulfilled performance demand out of the total number of contract goals witch are possible to assess in the contract. 

The data on the process of contracting were collected as the agency heads subjective assessment of various aspects of contracting. The agency heads’ assessment were collected as a web based survey from the spring 2010 to the autumn 2010. The survey was sent to 54 of the 58 agency heads, who had negotiated and managed the agency contracts for 2008​[1]​. The response-rate is 69 %. 

The ‘dialogic character’ of the contract processes is measured as the agency heads’ experience of their vis-à-vis the departments roles in various stages of the contracting process, of the existence of real sanctions if performance demands are not fulfilled and of whether contracting helps clarifying the department’s expectations towards the agency. 

The independent variables are the agency heads answer on the following four questions: 
1.	Do the department use contracting as a mean to increase control of the agency or as a mean to create more dialogue?
2.	Does contracting reduce the agency autonomy in relation to the department? 
3.	To what extend are the department’s wishes to performance demands different from the agency’s wishes to performance demands?
4.	To what extend are the departments’ wishes to criteria for assessing goal attainment different from the agency’s wishes to criteria for assessing goal attainment?
Analysis
The ambition of the analysis is to investigate variations within dialogue-based contracts: Do the ‘dialogic character’ of agencies performance contracts vary and does the degree of ‘dialogue’ affect the degree of goal attainment? The first section introduces contracting in Danish agencies. Second, we turn to the survey investigating variations in agency heads perceptions of dialogue-based performance contracts across Danish agencies. Finally, we investigate the argued link between the ‘dialogic character’ of contracting and goal attainment.
Contracting in Danish Agencies – an overview
The formal organization of most Danish ministries features two levels: the department who’s prime function is to be secretariat for the minister and one or more agencies who’s functions vary, but in general it can be described as being responsible for implementing policy. Agencies are a part of the ministerial hierarchy, but have their own management including agency head and budget. Although the organizing principle of ministries has been defined as ‘quite consistent’ (Binderkrantz & Christensen 2009b: 264) there are significant variations in the way various departments interact and interfere with agencies.  

The variation is a consequence of the fact that the Danish government is organized according to the principle of ministerial responsibility. This means, that not only the individual minister is responsible for the ministry including the agencies, but also that each ministry is responsible for as well as has a rather big autonomy for modernising and implementing public management reforms (Greve 2006:167). 

Performance contracts in the central administration were introduced as part of a performance management trend in the early 1990’s (Ministry of Finance 2000:13; Greve 2006:166). Today, contracts are almost universal for all agencies, and have become an institutionalised practice across Danish agencies (Greve & Ejersbo, 2005a). This means that most of the agencies are experienced in negotiating, entering and managing contracts.  

As Danish agency contracts are not legally binding and entered within the existing hierarchy of the ministries they have a dialogue-based character. The dialogue-based character is appropriate within the context of the Danish central administration as it has both an inbuilt flexibility and it suits the pragmatic culture of the administration (Greve 2000:161; Greve 2006). 

The ministerial autonomy when implementing public management reforms is also evident in contracting. Although the Ministry of Finance is granted the overall responsibility for public management reforms the means available for the ministry are to “…argue, persuade and create incentives for government departments to modernize…” (Greve 2006:167). This has also been the means when promoting the contract regime in the Danish central administration. Hence the ministry has developed a number of guidelines (Ministry of Finance 2000; 2003; 2010) describing the basic principles for a dialogue-based contracting regime. Despite the emphasis on contracting as a mean to put focus on agencies’ results and performance and to accommodate the inherent information asymmetry in the ministerial hierarchy, contracts are also meant to improve the dialogue between the department and their respective agencies (Ministry of Finance 2000:5 & 10). Furthermore, a focus on incentives rather than sanctions stresses the dialogue-based character of the contracting regime as described by the Ministry of Finance (Ministry of Finance 2000:32). 

A common feature of the various guidelines published by the Ministry of Finance is the fact that they grant a considerable degree of latitude to the individual ministries when entering contracts with the agencies. This is also reflected in a recent report from the Danish Audit of the State Accounts, which concludes that there are considerable differences among the contracting practices of the departments in relation to their respective agencies (Audit of the State Accounts 2009: 25). Variations between individual ministries’ implementation of contracts as part of their managerial regime have also been documented in a number of studies of respectively the development of the content of performance contracts in the Danish central administration (Binderkrants & Christensen 2009a; 2009b) as well as the goal attainment of the contracts (Binderkrantz & Christensen 2010; Bjørnholt & Salomonsen forthcoming). 
Variations in the ‘dialogic character’ of contracting across Danish agencies
Despite contracting in Danish agencies are generally characterized as dialogue-based performance contracts we expect variations in the degree of ‘dialogue’ in the processes of contracting. A central dimension of dialogue-based performance contracts is whether the contracting process is characterized by more or less dialogue between the principal and the agent. Table 1 shows the dialogue between departments and agencies at various stages of the contracting process. 

Table 1 Dialogue between departments and agencies at various stages of contracting processes
	The department alone	Department in dialogue with the agency	Equal collaboration between department and agency	Agency in dialogue with the department	Agency alone	Total i pct 
Who took the initiative to formulate the contract	2,7 (*1)	29,7(11)	21,6(8)	37,8(14)	8,1(3)	100
Who made the first draft of the performance demands 	-(0)	5,4(2)	-(0)	32,4(12)	62,2(23)	100
Who took the final decision on performance demands 	-(0)	54,1(20)	32,4(12)	13,5(5)	-(0)	100
Who defined the criteria for assessing performance demand	2,8(1)	27,8(10)	41,7(15)	22,2(8)	5,6(2)	100
 N= 37
*Total numbers in brackets  

As reflected in table 1 all stages of the contract process are generally characterised by collaboration or dialogue between the contracting parties, which supports the  characterization of performance contracts in the Danish agencies as ‘dialogue-based’. There are, however, differences across the stages. Hence, whereas almost half of the agencies took the initiative to formulate the contract (either alone 8 % or in dialogue with the department (38%), it is the department in dialogue with the agencies who primarily is responsible for finally deciding on the performance demands (54 %). However, the general conclusion is that the contracting process as experienced by the agency heads is a process characterised which for most parts involves equal collaboration or dialogue with the department 

As reflected in table 2 there exists, however, limits to the ‘dialogic character’ of the contracts as perceived by the agency heads. Hence, more than half of them agree or partly agree that there are real sanctions when performance demands are not fulfilled. Furthermore, agency heads find that contracts are institutions for settling and balancing the contracting parties’ expectations to agencies’ performance.  More than 83 % of the agency heads agree or partly agree that contracting helps clarify the departments’ expectations towards the agency. 

Table 2 Relations departments and agencies in contracting processes
	Agree	Partly agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Partly disagree	Disagree	Do not whish to answer/ do not know	Total i pct 
There are real sanctions when performance demands are not fulfilled	21,6(*8)	32,4(12)	16,2(6)	10,8(4)	16,2(6)	2,7(1)	100  
The departments’ use of contracts is merely symbolic	5,4(2)	18,9(7)	21,6(8)	8,1(3)	45,9(17)	-(0)	100 
Contracting helps clarify the departments’ expectations towards the agency	51,4(19)	32,4(12)	13,5(5)	2,7(1)	-(0)	-(0)	100 
N=37
*Total numbers in brackets  

In sum, despite contracting in Danish agencies are characterized as dialogue-based performance contracts we find variations in the degree of the ‘dialogic character’ of contracting process. The question is, however, whether the differences affect goal attainment.  
An ambiguous link between contracting processes and performance
Figure 1 illustrates that most agencies fulfils 80-85 % of the performance demands in their contract, but also the existence of real differences in the degree of goal attainment across agency contracts. In order to explain the variations below we investigate whether there is a positive relation between goal attainment and the independent variables: dialogue in favour of control, agreement between agencies and departments in the formulation of performance demands and criteria for assessments, and a high level of agencies’ autonomy.  

Figure 1. Percentage of fulfilled performance demands in the contracts
 

Agencies’ autonomy in contracting is expected to have a positive impact on goal attainment since agencies are believed to know best how to reach performance demands and autonomy and controlling agencies on results is a vehicle for the improvement of performance. Table 3 shows that the expectations are to some extend confirmed. Agency heads who partly disagree or neither agree, nor disagree that contracting reduces the agency’s autonomy in relation to the department have a significantly higher goal attainment than agency heads who agree or partly agree that contracting reduces their autonomy. Parwise comparison of the categories shows also that the goal attainment of agency heads who either partly disagree or neither agree, nor disagree that contracting reduces there autonomy are significantly higher that goal attainment of the agency heads who disagree (not illustrated). Hence, agency heads who partly disagree or neither agree, nor disagree that contracting reduces the agency’s autonomy in relation to the department fulfils around 20 % more performance demands than agency heads who disagree. The conclusion is not fully as expected, since agency heads who disagree that contracting reduces autonomy have lower goal attainment that all other agencies. Instead the result indicate that the agencies heads who have the highest score on goal attainment are those how take a middle position in their perception of whether contracting reduces agencies’ autonomy or who only find that their autonomy is partly reduced by contracting. It implies that autonomy has a positive impact on goal attainment until the level of experienced autonomy reaches a certain level. Hence a certain amount of shadow from the hierarchy in the contracting process seems to foster higher goal attainment in performance contracts.       

Table 3. Relation between agency heads’ perceptions of autonomy in contracting and goal attainment 
Contracting reduces the agency’s autonomy in relation to the department 
	Mean*	Standard error	Maximum – Minimum
Agree & Partly agree 	72,2	4,984	62,1-82,4
Neither agree nor disagree	80,6	3,681	73,1-88,1
Partly disagree 	82,7	3,860	74,8-90-5
Disagree 	62,7	3,860	54,9-70,6
*Mean of fulfilled performance demands 
N=37 
An F-test indicated that the difference for the model is significant at the 0.005 level 

Although not statistically significant we find a similar pattern when we investigate the relation between goal attainment and department’s use of contracting as a mean to increase control or dialogue. We expected that using contracts as dialogue in favour of control would increase goal attainment since dialogue is a motivational factor which increases agents’ incentives to perform in accord with agreed performance demands in contracting and dialogue may serve as a substitute for control. As reflected in table 4 this is not the whole story. Agency heads who find that contracting is both a mean to increase control and dialogue have the highest goal attainment. Furthermore, agency heads who find that departments use contracting to both increase control and dialogue but in favour of dialogue score higher on goal attainment than agency heads how take more extreme positions and either primarily agree that departments use contracting to increase control or dialogue. Thus, in agencies where contracting balances between control and dialogue goal attainment is higher that in agencies where departments primarily use contracting to increase either control or dialogue. The findings do not support the favour of dialogue to control when we look only on the extreme perceptions of dialogue and control. Agency heads who perceive contracting as a mean to dialogue in favour of control score lower on goal attainment than agency heads who primarily find that departments use contracting as a mean to increase control. In the two extreme positions the differences between agencies goal attainment are, however, low and the findings seem to support that balancing control and dialogue increase goal attainment. Hence, although not statistically significant we find a tendency for the dialogue characterising dialogue-based performance contracts to increase goal attainment when it is combined with a moderate amount of traditional hierarchical control. 

Table 4 Relation between agency heads’ perception of whether the department uses contracting as a mean to increase the control of the agency or as a mean to create more dialogue and goal attainment.

A: The department uses contracting as a mean to increase the control of the agency B: The department uses contracting as a mean to create more dialogue
	Mean*	Standard error	Maximum – Minimum
1 & 2) Agrees primarily with A  	70,9	4,207	62,3-79,4
3)	83,9	5,696	72,3-95,5
4) 	77,1	3,729	69,6-84,7
5) Agrees primarily with B	68,6	5,696	57,0-80,2
*Mean of fulfilled performance demands 
N=37 

The mixed finding leave us with the question whether goal alignment and the balancing of expectations between agencies and departments increases goal attainment. We expected that agreement between departments and agencies on performance demand and the criteria for assessing goal attainment would increase goal attainment. This is due to the balancing of departments and agencies’ priorities and expectations and agencies are more accountable towards demands and criteria they agree on. Table 5 illustrate the relation between agency heads’ perceptions of agreement on performance demands in contracting and goal attainment, which support the expectations. The relation is not statistically significant but it indicates that the degree to which agency heads find that agencies and departments agree on performance demands have an impact on goal attainment. Thus, the higher agreement between departments and agencies on performance demands the higher goal attainment.   

Table 5 Relation between agency heads’ perceptions of agreement on performance demands in contracting and goal attainment 
The department’s wishes to performance demands are very different from the agency’s wishes to performance demands 
	Mean*	Standard error	Maximum – Minimum
Agree & Partly agree 	50,0	13,408	22,7-77,3
Neither agree nor disagree	68,3	5,068	58,0-78,7
Partly disagree 	73,8	3,583	66,5-81,1
Disagree 	80,8	3,462	73,8-87,9
*Mean of fulfilled performance demands 
N=37 

A similar conclusion pleads to the link between goal attainment and agreement between departments and agencies on the criteria for assessing goal attainment. As illustrated in table 6, the higher agreement between departments and agencies on the criteria for assessing goal attainment the higher goal attainment. Again the correlation is not statistically significant but it supports the former conclusion and indicates that agreement between departments and agencies at various stages of contracting have a positive impact on goal attainment.     

Table 6. Relation between agency heads’ perceptions of agreement on criteria for assessing goal attainment and goal attainment 
To what extend are the departments’ wishes to criteria for assessing goal attainment different from the agency’s wishes to criteria for assessing goal attainment?
	Mean*	Standard error	Maximum – Minimum
Agree & Partly agree 	62,7	10,117	42,1-83,3
Neither agree nor disagree	69,2	6,398	56,2-82,2
Partly disagree 	75,3	3,470	68,3-82,4
Disagree 	78,6	3,968	70,5-86,7
*Mean of fulfilled performance demands 
N=37 

In sum, the analysis supports to some extent the general expectation that a dialogue-based contracting process increases the goal attainment of agencies’ performance contracts. We found that dialogue in favour of control, and a certain level of perceived autonomy to the agency increase goal attainment. However, both dialogue and autonomy should be balanced with some element of the traditional hierarchical relation – either as an element of control in the contracting process or as a limitation to the autonomy granted to the agencies. Furthermore, we found that agreement between agencies and departments in the formulation of performance demands and criteria for assessments have a positive impact on goal attainment. Thus, agreement between departments and agencies seems to improve the performance of agencies. We may, therefore, conclude that the effectiveness and efficiency of internal dialogue-based contracting in order to fulfil performance demands depend on the ‘dialogic character’ of contracting processes. It does not mean, however, that ‘the more dialogue the better’ since the ‘dialogue’ has to be combined with a moderate amount of traditional hierarchical control in order to increase goal attainment.  
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^1	  There were 4 agency heads, which it was not possible to make contract with. 
